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Abstract
This paper empirically assesses the impact of a discontinuous tax
schedule on prices, markups and product assortment in the Brazilian
automobile industry. To this end, I estimate a structural, equilibrium
model of demand and supply for over a hundred different models and
engine sizes of automobiles. With the model estimates of price elasticities and marginal costs I quantify how market power impacts the
progressivity of the discontinuous tax schedule. I also examine how
firms would reposition their products to avoid the tax and quantify
the impact of this repositioning on equilibrium outcomes.
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Introduction

A notched commodity tax schedule - where a small change in a product
characteristic creates a discontinuous change in tax liability - is often used
in differentiated goods markets as policy tool to prevent the purchase of
goods with a particular attribute (Slemrod, 2010; Sallee and Slemrod, 2012;
Ito and Sallee, 2018). Examples include the U.S. guzzler tax and automobile taxes in many countries. At the same time, differentiated goods markets are usually characterized by a small number of multi-product firms. In
this setting, prices and product assortment are the equilibrium outcome of
firms’ oligopolistic competition and firms exert market power. Yet, the empirical public finance literature typically studies notched taxes within the
perfect competition framework. Therefore, little is known about how product differentiation and market power impact the effectiveness of notched
taxes as a policy tool.
This paper is an empirical study of the impact of a notched tax schedule on equilibrium product assortment and prices in a market that is differentiated and concentrated. The effects of a notched tax schedule in an
oligopolistic industry with multi-product firms can be complex. A notched
tax schedule raises all prices and reduces total demand. However, the
notches also change the relative prices of products in different areas of the
product space. These changes in relative prices shift demand away from
products facing higher tax rates to products facing smaller tax rates. In
a setting in which firms have market power, the shift in demand affects
the markups firms can earn and their incentives to supply products in each
area of the product space.
My setting is the Brazilian automobile industry. Brazil is ranked as
the 7th largest producer of automobiles and 4th largest consumer market
for automobiles in the world. The market is relatively closed; most of the
automobiles sold in Brazil are domestically produced. The market is highly
differentiated; there are over a hundred different models and engines sizes
that consumers can choose. The market is highly concentrated; the market
share of the largest four firms is over 80%.1 The market is also heavily
taxed. Consumers in Brazil pay two kinds of taxes when they purchase a
1

Chevrolet (GM), Fiat, Ford and Volkswagen.
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new car: a sales tax of 25% and an engine tax with ad-valorem rate that
increases with car engine displacement.2 The rate is 7% for engines up to
1L, 11% for engines between 1L to 2L and 18% for engines above 2L.
The engine tax has been used to address distributive and environmental concerns. It is a luxury tax; cars with larger engines are also more
expensive and presumably purchased by high-income consumers. It is also
a way to promote the purchase of smaller cars which are more fuel efficient
and pollute less. To quantify how firms’ pricing and product assortment
responses affect the government’s ability to achieve its distributive and environmental goals, I build a structural model of market demand and supply
of cars in Brazil.
I model demand for different cars using the random coefficient logit
model proposed by Berry et al. (1995) (hereafter BLP). The BLP framework is flexible enough to generate elasticities that depend on vehicle attributes and the distribution of consumer incomes. It does so while accounting for car characteristics known to both consumers and firms but
not observed to the econometrician. The model also allows me to obtain
price elasticities for cars that were not offered, which is key to study how
firms choose product assortment.
In the supply model, I assume that in each year the multi-product firms
play a two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the subset of products they will offer in Brazil, taking as
fixed the set of available models and engines sizes that they produce worldwide. In the second stage, given the products chosen in the first stage,
firms simultaneously choose prices. The equilibrium of the Bertrand-Nash
pricing game played in the second stage is characterized by a system of first
order conditions in which firms equate their residual marginal revenues to
marginal costs. As a result, the demand estimates and observed prices
imply estimates of marginal cost for each product offered. Given these estimates and a parametric assumption on how the cost function depends on
attributes of the automobiles, I estimate the marginal cost function.
2

Engine displacement is the combined volume of the pistons inside the cylinders of
an engine. It is a commonly used measure of engine size. The aforementioned rates
are for automobiles that run on gasoline, ethanol or both, i.e, bifuel cars. For gasoline
automobiles, the displacement bins are the same, but the rates are 7%, 13%, and 25%
respectively.
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The model is estimated using a detailed dataset on product sales, prices,
and characteristics. A product is defined at the model and engine displacement level. For example, the VW Golf (model) 1.6L (engine displacement)
is a product and the VW Golf 2L is another product. The data spans
the 2005-2012 period. The preference parameters are estimated using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed by Berry (1994), Berry
et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001).
With the demand and marginal cost estimates I perform a series of
counterfactuals to quantify the distortions caused by the engine tax and
market power on equilibrium outcomes. The first counterfactual holds the
set of products offered fixed and investigates how market power affects the
progressivity of the engine tax. The second counterfactual examines how
firms would reposition their products to avoid the tax and quantify the
impact of this repositioning on equilibrium outcomes.
The results obtained in the first counterfactual indicate that market
power is the main factor distorting market outcomes. I find that markups
over marginal cost account for 85% of the price increase and 78% of the sales
decrease relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark without the engine
tax. Furthermore, firms’ strategic price responses generate heterogeneous
and incomplete pass-through of the engine tax: average pass-through is
85% for products in the first tax bin, 97% for products in the second tax
bin and 96% for products in the third tax bin.
The markups over marginal costs and the incomplete and heterogeneous
tax pass-through have direct policy implications. With the markup estimates for each vehicle offered and based on the methodology and parameters used by the Brazilian government to compute CO2 emissions (MMA,
2014), I compute the implicit CO2 tax implied by market power in the
counterfactual setting without the engine tax.3 The average estimates of
the implicit tax range from $70 to $115 per metric ton of CO2 . These numbers are greater than recent social cost of carbon estimates of $50 (Wagner
et al., 2021), and thus suggest that the engine tax would increase allocative
inefficiencies even further.
3

What I define as the implicit CO2 tax implied by market power is the markup
measured in Brazilian currency divided by the expected total CO2 emissions of each
vehicle.
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Using the value of the taxes paid by consumers and choice probabilities obtained under different competitive conduct assumptions, I construct
different Suits indexes (Suits, 1977). The Suits index is a Gini coefficient
that associates the cumulative share of taxes to the cumulative share of
consumers, ranked from lowest to highest income. It ranges from −1 to 1,
with negative values indicating a regressive tax, positive values indicating
a progressive tax and 0 indicating a proportional tax.
With marginal cost pricing and the engine tax, the index is 0.71. In
contrast, with Bertrand-Nash pricing and the engine tax, the index is 0.76.
Hence, market power increases the progressivity of the engine tax. It does
so through two channels. First, tax pass-through is smaller for the vehicles
in the first tax bin and these vehicles are more likely to be purchased by
consumers with lower income. Second, market power increases all prices
and thus reduce the market participation of consumers at the bottom and
middle of the income distribution.
The second counterfactual examines how firms would reposition their
products to avoid the discontinuities of the engine tax and quantify the
impact of this repositioning on equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the
previous counterfactual, for which I only needed to compute equilibrium
prices for a fixed set of products, I now need to compute equilibrium prices
and product assortment. Obtaining this equilibrium is computationally
challenging as firms have a large set of actions to choose from. To address
this issue, I use the algorithm proposed by Fan and Yang (2020). I find that
the discontinuities of the engine tax lead firms to choose engine sizes away
from the thresholds defined by the tax schedule. This movement decreases
the variety of engine sizes observed in the market and this reduction in
variety plays an important role in reducing total sales. Not accounting
for this variety effects would understate the ability of the engine tax in
reducing CO2 emissions.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. Recently, the
insights of Berry et al. (1995); Pakes et al. (2015) have been extended to
study how policy changes impacts equilibrium product assortment. Examples include the impact of mergers on product positioning (Fan, 2013; Fan
and Yang, 2020), the effect of bailing out truck manufacturers on truck
offering (Wollmann, 2018) and the impact of competition on product as4

sortment (Eizenberg, 2014; Nosko, 2014; Sullivan, 2020). Furthermore, a
growing empirical literature has focused in quantifying how market power
impacts the ability of taxation as a tool to achieve a determined policy
goal (e.g revenue, CO2 abatement, etc). Examples include Miravete et al.
(2018); Preonas (2019); Fowlie et al. (2016). I add to both literatures by
studying not only equilibrium price responses to a notched tax but also by
documenting and showing the empirical relevance of product assortment
responses.4
The second contribution of this paper is to the empirical literature that
investigates the distributional impact of regulation in a variety of industries.
Miravete et al. (2020); Stolper (2021) investigate the interaction between
market power and the distributional impact of regulation in the Pennsylvania market for spirits and the Spanish gasoline market, respectively. Durrmeyer (2022) quantifies the equilibrium effects of the bonus/malus policy
in the French automobile industry and analyzes the distributional impact of
the policy. I add to this literature by studying a developing country where
the high degree of income inequality makes the distributional impact of
regulation a key policy object, and by quantifying the role of market power
in affecting the progressivity of the regulation.
Lastly, this paper adds to a literature using structural models of supply
and demand to study the impact of hypothetical and factual environmental
regulation in the automobile industry. Examples include Goldberg (1998);
Klier and Linn (2012); Huse and Lucinda (2013); Adamou et al. (2013);
Grigolon and Verboven (2014); Durrmeyer and Samano (2017); Reynaert
(2020). These papers have restricted their attention to the U.S. and European countries (e.g. France, Germany and Sweden) and have mainly
evaluated the aggregate impact of CAFE policies, taxes, fees and rebates
on consumers decision to purchase more fuel efficient automobiles. I add
to this literature by studying the progressivity of the engine tax and by
addressing not only the impact of the engine tax on consumers choice, but
4

Kroft et al. (2021) provide a theoretical framework to contrast specific and advalorem commodity taxes in settings with imperfect competition and entry/exit of firms.
We depart from them in two aspects. First, I consider a notched tax schedule and thus
I am not able to cast the analysis in terms of infinitesimal changes in taxes. Second,
instead of considering firms’ entry/exit decisions I consider the assortment decisions of
multi-product firms which requires obtaining own and cross price elasticities.
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also the impact of the engine tax on the composition of cars offered.
The next section presents an overview of the Brazilian automobile industry and describes the data. Section 3 describes the behavioral model.
Section 4 discuss the identification and estimation of the model. Section
5 presents the estimates of the demand and marginal cost parameters. It
also discusses the substitution patterns implied by the model. Section 6
presents the counterfactual analysis. Lastly, section 7 concludes.

2

Institutional Background and Data

2.1

Overview

In 2012, Brazil was the 7th largest producer of automobiles and the 4th
largest consumer market for automobiles in the world. The automobile industry in Brazil was worth $94 billion, which is roughly 19% of its industrial
GDP. Most of this production, roughly 90%, was sold domestically. These
sales account for approximately 86% of total automobile sales in Brazil.
Thus, the automobile market in Brazil is not only large, but also relatively
closed.
Brazil levies a high import tariff on automobiles. The tariff is 35%.
Automobiles produced in Mexico are exempt from this tariff due to a trade
agreement between the two countries. Also exempt are automobiles produced in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela who are members
of Mercosur, the South American common market. The high import tariff is an important factor explaining why Brazil’s automobile market is so
closed. Import tariffs and domestic production shares are much lower in
the United States and in major European countries (Belgium, Germany,
Great Britain, Spain, France and Italy) are much lower.5
In addition to being relatively closed, the automobile market in Brazil
is also relatively concentrated. The main manufacturers in Brazil are foreign firms. They include GM and Ford from the United States; Citroen,
Peugeot, and Renault from France; Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen from
Germany; Fiat from Italy and Honda and Toyota from Japan. Using data
that I will describe in more detail in the next section, Table 1 reports their
5

See Cosar et al. (2018).
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market shares in 2012. Fiat is the largest manufacturer and has 25.6% of
the market. The market share of the top 4 firms is 80%. By contrast,
the market share of top 4 firms in the United States is 53% and it ranges
between 44% to 65% for the major European countries.6
Table 1: Sample of firms in 2012.
Firm
Chevrolet (GM)
Fiat
Volkswagen
Ford
Renault
Honda
Toyota
Others

2.2

Market Share (%)
19.7
25.3
24.1
9.6
6.7
4.4
2.3
7.9

Automobile Taxes

The government levies several kinds of taxes on the sale of new automobiles.
All but one have uniform rates and I treat these as equivalent to a sales
tax of 25%. The non-uniform tax is known as IPI, which is the Portuguese
acronym for tax on industrialized products. This tax is the focus of this
paper and hereafter will be referred as the engine tax.
The engine tax is a discontinuous function of engine displacement, a
measure of engine size.7 For automobiles that run on gasoline, the tax is
7% when engine displacement is 1L or less; 13% when engine displacement
is between 1L and 2L; and 25% when engine displacement exceeds 2L. For
automobiles that can also run on ethanol (bifuel), the displacement bins
are the same, but the rates are 7%, 11%, and 18% respectively.
An important feature of the engine tax schedule is the “jumps” or discontinuities in the rates (in the public finance literature, they are called
6

See Cosar et al. (2018).
Engine displacement is the combined volume of the pistons inside the cylinders
of an engine. More information on what is engine displacement can be found at
https://www.yourmechanic.com/article/what-is-engine-displacement
7
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notches). Notched tax schedules based on engine size are present not only
in Brazil but also in other major automobile markets like China and Japan;
and midsize markets like the UK and Turkey. Historically, the Brazilian
government rationale for the engine tax is that it works as a luxury tax. Automobiles with larger engines are more expensive and likely to be purchased
by high income consumers. Furthermore, automobiles with larger engines
also emit significantly more CO2 than automobiles with smaller engines.
Therefore, another likely rationale for the engine tax is that government
wanted to reduce CO2 emissions.
The schedule of rates is mostly fixed throughout my sample period
of 2005 to 2012. However, in response to the world financial crisis, the
government did temporarily reduce the rates in 2009, the first quarter of
2010, and in 2012. These reductions did not affect the tax thresholds
determining the engine displacement bins. Since these changes were the
result of a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy intended to stimulate
automobile sales, I will treat them as exogenous variation in prices.
The engine tax schedule may have shifted supply away from large engine
automobiles towards lower engine automobiles. Figure 1a and 1b displays
the fraction of automobiles offered by engine size and fuel type. The plots
are constructed by pooling the data over the sample period. For both fuel
types, most of the automobiles offered have engines that are either 1L or
between 1L and 2L. A striking feature of the plots is the bunching at the
tax thresholds, especially for gasoline-powered engines. Note that there
are no bifuel automobiles with engines larger than 2L. At first glance, this
result may seem surprising since the engine tax rate on these automobiles
is 7% higher for gasoline engines than for bifuel engines. However, most of
the automobiles in this bin are made in Mexico, not in Brazil.

2.3

Data

The data on the automobile market in Brazil come from a variety of sources.
The quantity data are provided by the national department of traffic (DENATRAN).8 These data are at the model/engine displacement/trim level
8

In Brazil, one is required to pay a fee when registering a new car and also to pay a
yearly ownership tax that depends on the market value of the car. Therefore, I expect
the government to keep an accurate record of the number of new vehicles registered.
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Figure 1: Product offering vs. tax rate by engine displacement
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(e.g., Honda Civic 1.8L LX and Honda Civic 1.8L EX) and covers the
period from 2005 to 2012.
The data on manufacturer’s suggested list retail prices are obtained
from Quatro Rodas, a Brazilian magazine specializing in automobiles. This
magazine is also the source of information on a set of automobile characteristics: horsepower, safety features such as airbag and ABS, and comfort
features such as air conditioning and automatic transmission. Information on automobile weight and fuel consumption is obtained from Molicar,
a consulting firm specializing in the automobile industry, and Carros na
Web, a specialized website that reports technical specifications of almost
every car sold in Brazil.
I constructed measures of fuel efficiency using annual retail prices of
ethanol and gasoline from the National Agency of Petroleum (ANP). I use
data from the National Bureau of Statistics (IBGE) to construct a measure
of market size. My measure is the number of households in the middle and
upper income classes, i.e., with monthly income equal to or greater than
three times the minimum wage. To estimate the distribution of income in
Brazil, I use the average income reported in IBGE and the Gini coefficient
reported by the World Bank.
The sample is an unbalanced panel containing every car made in Brazil,
Mexico, and members of Mercosur and sold in Brazil during the period
2005 to 2012. The data excludes SUVs and trucks and covers 89% of all
registrations in Brazil during that period.9
9

As highlighted by the high coverage, SUVs were still in their infancy during our
sample period.
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A model often comes with different engine sizes (e.g., Honda Civic 1.8L,
Honda Civic 2L). The literature on automobile demand (e.g., Berry et al.
(1995, 1999); Petrin (2002)) has typically aggregated across engine sizes
and defined a product as a model (e.g Honda Civic). However, my data
on quantities and prices are more detailed and, as a result, I can define a
product as a model and engine-displacement combination (e.g., VW Golf
1.6L, Honda Civic 1.8L, Honda Civic 2L). This is especially important in
my case since the tax rate of a model can vary substantially depending
upon the size of its engine.
Table 2 reports the number of products and models offered in each year
of the sample period. The first two columns establish that the number
of products and models are increasing over time. Column 3 demonstrates
that the mean number of different engines-displacement offered per model
is relatively stable around two. Column 4 demonstrates that the average
number of models across firms that is made in Brazil is relatively stable over
time. It then follows that the increase in the number of products is coming
from an increase in the number of imported models offered every year and
not from an increase in the number of engines offered per model. Column
5 reports the number of models that come with engine displacements of
1L and more than 1L. Column 6 shows that these models account for a
sizeable share of sales. These data underscore the importance of defining
products at the model-engine displacement level and highlight the stability
of firms’ domestic production lines.
Table 2: Evolution number of products offered.
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

#Products #Models
91
99
98
106
115
134
140
145

47
52
54
59
65
67
72
73

Mean
#engine-displacement
1.94
1.9
1.81
1.8
1.77
2
1.94
1.99

Mean # domestic
models per firm
4.1
4.3
4.5
4.6
4.9
5
5
5.2

# of Models more
than 1 tax bin
15
15
13
13
12
12
13
14

M. Share of Models
more than 1 tax bin (%)
59
59
48
46
48
50
50
52

Table 3 reports total automobile sales and product market shares by
tax bin. Total sales rose steadily from 1.34 million in 2005 to 2.6 million in
2012. The information on product shares establish some interesting trends
in the composition of cars bought. First, models with medium-size engines
10

(1L to 2L) become more popular over the sample period. Their sales share
increased in 12.3 p.p while their share in the total number of products
offered increased only 4.2 p.p. Second, the popularity of models with small
engines (1L) declined. Their sales share decreased 12.4 p.p while their share
of the total number of products offered decreased only 4.1 p.p. The sales
and product shares of models with large engines exhibit no trend. These
patterns suggest that models with small and medium size engines are closer
substitutes with each other than with models of large engines. It is also
consistent with the hypothesis that the substantially higher tax rates on
models with large engines drive consumers and firms away from this area
of the product space
Table 3: Sales and share of products by tax bin.
Year

Sales

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

1,343,826
1,517,643
1,867,665
2,120,857
2,383,719
2,485,533
2,429,346
2,665,036

% Sales per engine segment

% Cars offered per engine segment

<1L
57.1
58
56.7
51.9
54.1
53.2
50.5
44.7

<1L (1L, 2L]
16.5
81.3
15.2
80.8
15.3
81.6
15.1
81.1
13.9
82.6
11.9
85.1
12.1
85.7
12.4
85.5

(1L, 2L]
42.8
41
42.3
47.1
45.3
46.2
49.1
55.1

>2L
.2
1
1
.9
.7
.6
.5
.3

>2L
2.2
4
3.1
3.8
3.5
3
2.1
2.1

Table 4 displays the sales-weighted averages of the variables used in
the demand model. All monetary variables are in 2010 Reais ($), the
Brazilian currency. Prices are post-tax. The characteristic variables consist
of horsepower (Hp), the number of kilometers one can drive with one Real
(Km/$), horsepower per 100Kg (HPW), a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the car is bifuel and 0 otherwise (Bifuel), a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if automatic transmission is a standard feature and 0 otherwise
(At), a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if air-conditioning is a standard
feature and 0 otherwise (Air), a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if either
ABS airbags are standard features and 0 otherwise (Safety), and the trunk
volume measured in liters.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows that automobiles prices are declining over
time. Prices are roughly constant during the first four years of the sample
but fall substantially over the next four years. A key factor behind this
11

decline is the temporary cuts in engine tax rates. Columns 3 and 4 indicate
that cars are becoming more powerful as both Hp and HPW increase over
time. Column 5 shows that automobiles are also becoming cheaper to
drive. In 2005, the average car drove 3.7 Km per Real, whereas in 2012 the
average care drove 4.5 km per real. This decrease in the cost of driving is
likely driven by the rising fraction of bifuel automobiles reported in Column
6.10 The last four columns show that automobiles are becoming safer, more
comfortable to drive and larger. The share of automobiles with ABS and/or
airbags as a standard feature increases over time, as does the share of
automobiles with automatic transmission and air-conditioning as standard
features. Lastly, average trunk size is consistently increasing over time.
Table 4: Average sales-weighted product characteristics.
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Price
42,025
43,276
43,313
43,595
39,368
37,859
36,486
34,615

HP HPW Km/$ Bifuel At Air Safety Trunk (L)
83.08 8.26
3.75
.49
.01 .24
.13
333.38
84.22 8.28
3.66
.9
.01 .25
.15
338
85.54 8.46
4.28
.95
.02 .27
.15
342.73
87.25 8.54
4.59
.97
.03 .28
.14
343.33
88.08 8.62
4.67
.98
.02 .26
.14
350.55
89.43 8.77
4.32
.99
.04 .26
.13
347.18
91.43 8.83
4.13
.99
.05 .29
.18
347.68
93.78 8.92
4.46
.99
.07 .34
.29
351.6

Note: The entry in each cell of the last 7 columns is the sales weighted mean. Prices are in 2010 BRL.

2.4

Potential Products

To study how the engine tax schedule affects the set of products offered, I
require not only data on the products that firms supplied in Brazil but also
data on the set of products that firms could have supplied. To construct
this set of products, I first use the data previously described to identify the
set of models and engine sizes that each firm sold in Brazil in 2005 (e.g Clio
1L, Clio 1.6L Astra 2L). For each of these models, I identify the set of engine
sizes that the firm produced and offered outside of Brazil (e.g Clio 1.1L,
Clio 1.4L, Astra 1.6L and Astra 2.2L).11 The union of these two sets gives
10
By allowing cars to run with any mixture of ethanol and gasoline, bifuel cars provide
more flexibility to consumers and thus may reduce the cost of driving.
11
The list of the engines available outside Brazil can be found in Wikipedia and
specialized websites like https://www.auto-data.net/en
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me the set of products that firms could have chosen to produce in Brazil
in 2005 but did not. I then impute the characteristics of these alternative
products based on a flexible regression model that predicts Km/L and
Weight as a function of HP, engine displacement, model fixed effects and
year fixed effects for the sample of products sold in Brazil. For AT, AIR
and Safety, I assign the characteristic of the best seller product within that
model.
Table 5 displays summary statistics for the set of alternative products.
There is a total of 66 products that firms could have offered in Brazil but
did not. Every firm except Audi had products that they did not offer in
Brazil but sold elsewhere in the world. Chevrolet had by far the largest set
of alternative products. They could have offered 24 products based on 6
different models. One interesting feature of the set of alternative products
is the number of small engines with 1.1L or 1.2L displacement. Outside
of Brazil, models with these engines displacements seem quite popular.
However, during my sample period they were not offered in Brazil.
Table 5: Characteristics of products that were not offered in Brazil in 2005.
Maker
Chevrolet
Citroen
Fiat
Ford
Honda
Peugeot
Renault
Toyota
Volkswagen

#Products

#Models

24
3
6
7
4
5
8
3
6

6
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
2

Min.
#Engines
3
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2

Max.
#Engines
5
2
3
5
3
3
4
2
4

Min.
Max.
Displacement Displacement
1.2
2.2
1.1
1.8
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.6
1.1
2
1.1
1.8
1.4
1.6
1.2
2.3

Min.
HP
75
61
65
60
78
60
58
97
54

Max.
HP
200
115
105
101
110
136
116
110
170

Figure 2 displays the average Km/$ and HPW by engine displacement
for the set of products offered in Brazil in 2005 and the products that could
have been offered. The figures indicate that the alternative products with
1.1L and 1.2L engines have on average similar Km/$ and HPW to the
offered products with 1L. It also indicates that the alternative products
with 1.1L and 1.2L engines have on average similar Km/$ and HPW to the
products offered with 1.4L and 1.6L engines. The absence of any models
with 1.1L and 1.2L engines in Brazil despite being not substantially different in observed characteristics (e.g. Km/$ and HPW) than the 1L models
is further evidence that the tax thresholds affected product assortment.
13

Figure 2: Attributes - Potential Cars vs. Cars offered
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Model

This section presents the behavioral model used to formalize the industry
environment described in the previous section. I describe how consumers
make choices, the firms’ problem and define the equilibrium.

3.1

Demand

There are T markets, defined as Brazil in a given year. In each market
there are It potential consumers that choose to buy one product or none.
The indirect utility of a product j for consumer i in year t depends on the
price and characteristics of the product:

uijt = xjt βi − αit pdjt + ϕm + ξjt + ϵijt
i = 1, ..., Mt ; j = 0, ..., Jt ; t = 2005, ..., 2012

(1)

where xjt is a K-dimensional vector of observed characteristics, pdjt is the
post-tax price paid by consumers, ϕm is a car model fixed effect, ξjt is a
scalar characteristic which is observed by consumers and firms but not to
the econometrician and ϵijt captures idiosyncratic shocks on consumers’ i
taste for car j. Moreover, the car model fixed effect captures the unobserved
characteristics that are common among all different engine size versions of
the same model (e.g. prestige, style, advertising, etc) across years.
I incorporate individual heterogeneity in price sensitivity and in the
taste for vehicle characteristics by assuming that,
14

αit =

α
yit

βi = β + Σηi , ηi ∼ N (0, I)
where yit is the income of consumer i ∈ It and ηi are random draws from a
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and an identity covariance
matrix which is also independent of consumer’s income, yi . Lastly, ϵijt is
assumed to be IID (across consumers and alternatives) Type-I Extreme
Value.
My parametrization allows the utility generated by different products
to be correlated with respect to observed characteristics and prices. Thus,
it relaxes the IIA property of the commonly used multinomial logit model
and allows for flexible substitution patterns. Furthermore, the consumer
heterogeneity in price sensitivity and taste for characteristics is the key
element of the model capturing what drives firms’ incentives to provide
product variety.
The indirect utility uijt can be decomposed in two parts. Let,

δjt = xjt β + ϕm + ξjt
µijt = − αit pdjt + x′jt Σηi

(2)

be the mean utility of car j and an individual-specific deviation from the
mean utility, respectively.
In each period t, Mt consumers choose among one of the many new cars
available (define Jt as the set of all cars offered) or the outside option of
not buying a new car (defined as choice 0):
ci = arg max uijt
j∈Jt ∪0

(3)

The indirect utility of the outside option is normalized to be ui0 = ϵi0 .
Integrating out the Type-I Extreme Value shocks, we obtain the probability
of each consumer i buying car j:
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exp(δjt + µijt )
P
1 + k∈Jt exp(δkt + µikt )

sijt =

(4)

The predicted aggregate market share of car j in market t is obtained
by integrating over the distributions of consumer income and unobserved
heterogeneity, denoted by Fy (y) and Fη (η), respectively:

sjt (pdt , ξ t , Jt )

Z Z
=
y

3.2

η


exp δjt + µijt
 dFη (η)dFy (y)
Pt
1 + Jr=1
exp δrt + µirt

Supply

The automobile industry is comprised of multi-product car makers that
behave as oligopolistic, non-cooperative profit maximizers in the different
geographical markets. To model firms’ product choices, I make two assumptions on the set of products offered. The first imposes restrictions on
the set of products offered worldwide by car makers. The second imposes
restrictions on the set of products offered in Brazil.
I assume that, in every year, firm’s worldwide set of products is fixed
and exogenously defined. Specifically, the worldwide line-up of models, the
engines produced and offered per model, and the comfort and safety attributes of the models are predetermined. This assumption is motivated
by the observation that there is substantial engineering effort and R&D
investment into the development of a car model and into development of
an engine (Blonigen et al., 2017). Thus, it is unlikely that firms’ can immediately respond to global or specific market changes by creating a new
model or engine.
I also assume that, in every year, the models and the number of engines
offered per model in Brazil are exogenously defined. This assumption is
motivated by the observation that most cars sold in Brazil are also made in
Brazil, and that changing the models offered and the number of engines offered per model require firms to change the plant internal processes, adapt
the line of production, change inventory and advertise the changes. These
are presumably costly actions that take time to happen.12 Thus, the as12

An example is the case of Volkswagen Brazil.
Recently, it took then
an investment of US$ 800 million to adapt one of their Brazilian plants
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sumption that the models and the number of engines offered per model in
Brazil are exogenously defined seems like a reasonable (though imperfect)
simplification.
Given these assumptions, on the first stage, firms choose the combination of engines they will use to equip their models. To summarize, the
events of the two-stage game played by car makers in every year unfolds
according to the following:
1. Car makers observe the tax rates imposed by the government and the
fixed cost of each product. Then, they simultaneously choose what
products they will offer by choosing the engines they will equip their
models; lastly, they incur the fixed cost.
2. Car makers observe demand and marginal cost shocks (unobserved
to the econometrician) for each product chosen in the 1st stage of the
game and they simultaneously choose the prices they will charge.
At the 1st stage of the game, firms are assumed to know the distribution
of marginal cost and demand shocks but not their realizations. This is a
strong assumption but often made in the literature to rule out selection
effects. Firms solve the game backwards and so do I.
Stage 2: Pricing
Products are indexed by j, firms are indexed by f , car models are indexed
by m and markets are indexed by t. In any market t, let Jf t be the set of
products that firm f chose to produce in the first stage of the game. In
addition, Jt ≡ ∪f Jf t is the set of products offered in market t by all firms.
The marginal cost of each car j, mc(), is assumed constant and heterogeneous across products. In particular, it is a function of a Ks -dimensional
vector of observed car attributes, Wjt , a car model fixed effect, ψm , and a
cost shock, ωjt , which at this stage is observed to the firms.
The pre-tax price of a product j is defined as,
to receive the production of three additional car models.
For more on it
check: https://carros.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2017/11/13/fazer-carro-e-tao-caroque-ate-google-e-apple-desistiram-uol-carros-conta.htm
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pdj
1.25 × (1 + τipi )

psj =

(5)

where pd is the post-tax price. Firms simultaneously choose the pre-tax
prices of their products, psf t , in order to maximize their profits:

πf⋆ (Jf t , J−f t , ω t , ξ t ) = max
Mt
s
p

X


pskt −mc(Wkt , ψm , ωkt ) ×skt (pdt , ξ t , Jt )

k∈Jf t

(6)
where sjt (pdt , ξ t , Jt ) is the market share of product j and Mt is the market
size. Note that since firms observe all of the cost shocks in the market as
well as all of the demand shocks, they determine equilibrium prices. Thus,
we have that they are the source of bias into the price coefficient.
The equilibrium prices are the outcome of a non-cooperative BertrandNash game among the competing automakers and can be found as the
solution of the system composed by firms first order conditions:

X

sjt (pdt , ξ t , Jt )+
k∈Jf t

pskt −mck (Wkt , ωkt )

 ∂skt (pdt , ξt , Jt )
=0
∂psjt

∀j ∈ Jf t , ∀f

(7)
The first order condition for each product j can be rewritten in a way
that relates its pre-tax price to its marginal cost and markup. In matrix
notation:

d
pst = mct + ∆−1
×
s
p
,
ξ
,
J
t
|t
{z t t }

(8)

markup

where,

∆(jt,kt) =


 ∂skt
× (1 + τjt ) if j, k ∈ Jf t
∂pd
jt

0

otherwise.

To take the pricing equation to the data, I make the common assumption that marginal costs are an exponential function of the product attributes previously described. Rearranging terms and taking the logarithm:
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(9)

log(mcjt ) = Wjt θ + ψm + ωjt
Stage 1: Engine Choice

At this stage of the game firms simultaneously choose products. They
observe the fixed cost of every potential product, F Cj , but they do not know
the demand and marginal cost shocks (ξ and ω, respectively) that each
product in the market will face. However, firms do know the distribution
of these shocks, Fξ and Fω . As such, firms compare the expected variable
profit accrued with changing the set of products offered with the change in
fixed cost. Formally:

Jf⋆t

∈ arg max E
Jf t ∈Jf t

h
(ω ′t ,ξ′t )

πf∗

Jf t , J−f t , ω ′t , ξ ′t

i

−

X

F Cj , ∀f

(10)

j∈Jf t

where Jf t is the set of products available for firm f and E(.) is the expectation operator with respect to the joint distribution of marginal cost
and demand shocks. Jf t for 2005 is defined as the union between the set
of products observed being offered in Brazil with the set of products that
firms could have supplied (described in section 2).
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept of the game is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib

rium. Thus, an equilibrium is Jf⋆t , p⋆f t (Jt⋆ ) f ∈F such that prices satisfy
equation 7 and the set of products satisfy equation 10.

4

Estimation

This section outlines the procedure used to recover the demand and marginal
cost parameters. I construct a GMM estimator based on moments generated by interacting the structural demand errors, ξjt , and supply errors,
ωjt , with a set of instruments.
Consider the estimation of the demand parameters which are defined

to be θd = β, α, Σ . For any guess of the parameters (α, Σ) I can
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use the BLP contraction mapping to invert the demand system given by
equation 3.1. Since there is no closed form solution for this integral I rely
on simulation techniques and use 1000 Halton draws to approximate the
integral.13 Based on the definition of the mean utility δ, I construct the
sample analogue of the structural demand error for each car j:

ξjt θd = δjt − xjt β − ϕm
The interaction of the vector ξ with a set of exogenous instruments Z
generates the following GMM problem:
min ξ(θd )′ ZΩZ ′ ξ(θd )
θd

(11)

where Ω is a weight matrix that is constructed in a 2-step procedure. In
the first step the model is estimated assuming homoscedastic errors, i.e
Ω = (Z ′ Z)−1 . With the parameter estimates obtained in the first step I
construct estimates of the error term and use them to obtain an estimate
of the efficient weight matrix. In the second step, I re-estimate the GMM
problem using the efficient weight matrix.14
The minimization problem involves a potentially large number of parameters (K-dimensional vector β, α, Σ). To reduce the computational
burden, I rely on the fact that for any guess of α, and Σ the K-dimensional
vector β enters the moment conditions on a linear fashion and hence they
can be recovered with the following equation:
β̂ = (X ′ ZW Z ′ X)−1 X ′ ZW Z ′ δ(α, σ)
As it was pointed out by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014); Dube et al.
(2012), the GMM problem is highly non-linear and thus it is difficult to
find a global solution. To overcome this issue, I solve the equation 11 using
20 different random initial conditions and keep the estimates that generate
the smallest value for the objective function.
13

As proposed by Dube et al. (2012) I use a tight tolerance of 1e-14 to define the
convergence of the fixed point algorithm.
14
To eliminate the car model fixed effects ϕm I use a within transformation of the
data.
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Now, consider the pricing equation and the estimation of the marginal
cost parameters. With the demand estimates, I obtain the markup term in
equation 8. The markup estimates together with prices imply an estimate
for the marginal cost of each product. With the marginal cost for each
product, I estimate the parameters in equation 9 using standard linear
regression methods.

4.1

Specification

Consumers mean utility is assumed to be a function of Air, At, Saf ety,
year fixed effects and model fixed effects. Air, At and Saf ety are dummy
variables that capture the presence of air-conditioning, automatic transmission and safety as standard equipment. These variables are included
to provide a measure of how comfortable and safe the car is. Possibly,
they also provide a proxy for how luxurious the car might be. The year
fixed effects capture macroeconomic events that affect the value of buying
a car relative to the outside option of not buying a car. Lastly, the model
fixed effects capture unobserved characteristics that are common among
products from the same model (e.g. design, prestige, reliability, etc).
In addition to prices, the model taken to the data also considers heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes for three attributes, Km/$, HP W and T runk.
Km/$ is kilometers per Real (Brazilian currency) and provides a measure
of cost of driving; HP W is horse-power divided by weight and provides
a measure of automobile performance. T runk is the trunk space in 100L
and provides a measure of the cargo space of the vehicle, which can be
seen as a proxy for vehicle size. With this specification, the demand model
allows for flexible substitution patterns with respect to prices, measures
associated with different dimensions of engine performance (cost of driving
and power) and cargo space, which is a proxy for vehicle size. These are
key inputs driving the firms decisions of what engines they will equip their
cars.
One important feature to be considered when studying the impact of
taxation on market outcomes is how consumers divert from the product to
the outside option. Note that despite being a parsimonious specification
without a random coefficient on the constant, my parametrization is flex21

ible enough to break the IIA property with respect to the outside option.
First, the heterogeneity in price sensitivity implies that to some extent
each consumer has a different valuation of the outside option relative to
the available products.15 Second, the year fixed effects allow the constant
in each market to vary. So, in addition to having consumers with different
valuation for the outside good relative to the products available, the model
also allows this valuation to change across years.
The income draws yit are simulated from a truncated log-normal distribution. This log-normal distribution is constructed to fit the mean and the
Gini coefficient of the true Brazilian income distribution and the truncation is made at the 50th percentile which implies that I will only simulate
households that belong to the mid-class or above.16 The decision to truncate the income distribution is ad-hoc but has a straightforward rationale
behind it. Brazil is a low-income country and many households do not have
enough income to pay the monthly installment of even the cheapest car in
the market.17
In modeling supply, I assume that the marginal cost is a function of
Km/L, HP , Displacement, At, Air, Saf ety, log(P riceSteel × W eight),
year fixed effects and car model fixed effects. Intuitively, these are characteristics that should have a positive impact on marginal cost. Moreover,
the car model fixed effects that capture invariant cost attributes common
across different versions of the same model.

4.2

Identification

The GMM problem given by equation 11 requires a set of instruments Z
with rank greater or equal to the dimensionality of the demand parameter

vector θd = β, α, Σ . To construct such instruments, I rely on the
assumption of econometric exogeneity of the observed product space and
on the exogeneity of the tax structure faced by Brazilian automobiles. The
econometric exogeneity assumption can be stated as:
15

Think of it as the constant divided be αi .
The mean of the Brazilian income distribution is obtained from the National Survey of Households (PNAD) and the Gini coefficient is obtained from the World Bank
database.
17
In fact, approximately 13 million households are enrolled in Bolsa Familia which is
a government program that makes direct cash transfers to extremely poor/poor families.
16
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(12)

E[ξjt |Xt , ∀t] = 0

With the conditional moment restriction (CMR) in equation 12 we have
that the unobserved demand component of each car is uncorrelated with
observed attributes of every car, in every year, after we condition on car
model fixed effects. Intuitively, the CMR states that firms do not change
the observed characteristics as a response to the unobserved shocks or as a
response to forecasts on those shocks. Formally, the CMR follows the timing of the game played by firms.18 While the CMR is a strong assumption,
as long as the model fixed effects and year fixed effects capture what firms
can forecast about demand and cost shocks when choosing the products
they will offer, it is still a reasonable approximation.
The first implication of the CMR is that we can use variation within
model and over time in T runk, HP W , Km/$ , At, Air and Saf ety to
identify the coefficients that enter the mean utility. Second, it allows me to
follow Gandhi and Houde (2016) and construct instruments that measure
the amount of local competition faced by a product in the T runk, HP W
and Km/$ dimensions of the product space. These instruments provide the
exogenous variation required to identify the variance in tastes for T runk,
HP W , Km/$. In particular, for any product j they are constructed as:
Zj =

X

1(dxij

< sdx),

i̸=j

X

1(dxij


< sdx)xi

i̸=j

where x ∈ {W eight, HP } and dxij = |xj − xi |.
The next set of instruments provide exogenous variation in prices. They
are constructed based on cost exclusion restrictions and on the discontinuities generated by the Brazilian tax structure. The weight of the car
interacted with price of materials (steel) enters marginal cost but does not
affect consumer preferences. As such, I can use the interaction of weight
and price of materials as an excluded instrument for prices.
Furthermore, the discontinuities in tax liability generated by the tax
schedule induce price discontinuities around the displacement thresholds
defined by the tax code and as a result, they provide exogenous price varia18

A formal discussion of the role of timing assumptions in structural models can be
found in Ackerberg and Hahn (2015)
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tion. Moreover, the tax rate in each threshold changed over time during the
period in the sample. This change was a result of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy implemented by the Brazilian government in the face of the
global financial crises. Therefore, it is presumed to be exogenous to the
product space.
The identification of the marginal cost parameters follows a similar argument as the identification of the mean utility parameters. The (Econometric) exogeneity of the product space implies that the supply-side structural errors ωjt are mean independent of the car attributes that affect
marginal cost after we control for car model fixed effects, i.e E[ωjt |Wt , ∀t] =
0. With this assumption, the cost parameters are identified by within model
and over time variation in W .

5

Estimates

Table 6 displays the estimates of the random coefficient logit model and of
the marginal cost parameters. First, consider the variables that enter only
the mean utility term. With the exception of automatic transmission (AT),
all of the covariates that enter only the mean utility have the expected sign
and are statistically significant. Moreover, the negative coefficient on AT
may be an indication that this is perceived as a horizontal attribute instead
of a vertical one.
Consider the attributes that consumers are assumed to have heterogeneous tastes for. With the exception of the mean and variance of the
taste distribution for Km/$, all of the parameters are statistically significant. The distribution of the price sensitivity parameter is modeled using
the Brazilian income distribution. Therefore, I do not need to estimate
the mean or variance of the distribution but only the scaling parameter
α. The estimates are negative and significant and thus provide evidence of
heterogeneity in price sensitivity.
The mean of the distribution of marginal utility for HP W is negative
and significant and the standard deviation is statistically different than
zero. These estimates imply substantial heterogeneity in the taste for car
performance, and they also imply that most consumers (approximately
85%) prefer less powerful cars. The mean of the distribution of marginal
24

utility for T runk is negative and significant and the standard deviation is
statistically different than zero. These estimates imply substantial heterogeneity in the taste for cargo space, which we consider to be a proxy for
vehicle size, and indicate that most consumers (86%) prefer smaller cars.
The estimates of the marginal cost parameters are all positive and, with
the exception of Km/L, significant. Thus, as expected, it is costly to build
cars that are more fuel efficient, powerful, have automatic transmission, airconditioning and safety equipment. Moreover, log(P riceSteel × W eight),
which captures the cost of materials used to construct the car also has a
positive effect on marginal costs.
I now discuss the economic implications of the raw demand coefficients.
Table 6 displays descriptive statistics of the own price elasticities implied
by the demand model. Reassuringly, all products are priced at the elastic
part of the demand curve. The estimated elasticities range from 2.85 to
8.89 with the median elasticity being 4.93.
Table 6: Random coefficient logit demand (RCL) and marginal cost estimates.

Mean Utility (β)
HPW
Km/$
Trunk
AT
AIR
Safety

RC-Logit
Coefficient Robust SE
-0.295
0.051
-3.054
-0.187
0.408
0.418

(0.141)
(0.210)
(1.138)
(0.174)
(0.253)
(0.161)

7.042
0.284
0.366
2.877

(2.590)
(0.127)
(0.261)
(0.799)

Cost (γ)
Km/L
HP
Displacement
AT
AIR
Safety
log(P riceSteel × W eight)

Supply
Coefficient Robust SE
0.004
0.004
0.05
0.07
0.08
0.05
0.484

Consumer Heterogeneity
Price/Income
HPW
Km/$
Trunk
Elasticities
Median
Min.
Max.

Markup(%)
4.93
2.85
8.89

Median
Min.
Max.

Estimation Statistics
# of Observations
J-Statistic(DF)

928
13.78(6)
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22.68
14.35
40.88

(0.003)
(0.0003)
(0.02)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.098)

Based on a sample of products offered in 2005, tables 7 and 8 associate
some names with the substitution patterns implied by the model. The
general substitution patterns obtained with the demand estimates are well
exemplified by table 7. This table displays the own-price and cross-price
elasticities for the sample of the two best-sellers in each tax bin. Each
entry in the table gives the percentage change in the market share of the
column product associated with an infinitesimal change in the price of the
row product. Products in the first tax bin (e.g. VW Gol 1L and Fiat Uno
Mille) are close competitors to each other and to a smaller extent they also
compete with products in the second tax bin.
Products in the second tax bin (e.g. Fiat Palio 1.3L and VW Gol 1.6L)
are close competitors to each other but also to products in the first tax
bin. For example, an increase in the price of the Fiat Palio 1.3L has a
slightly higher impact on the share of the products in the first tax bin than
in the share of the VW Gol 1.6L. A similar pattern holds for the cross-price
elasticities of the VW Gol 1.6L. Lastly, products in the third tax bin are
close competitors to each other and have cross-price elasticities to products
in other tax bins that are of a different order of magnitude.
One important feature of the model is how consumers substitute between products and the outside option of not buying a car. To investigate
these substitution patterns, I follow Berry et al. (1995) and construct the
diversion ratio between each product and the outside option. Specifically,
for a small increase in the price of product j, I construct the percentage
of consumers that substitute from j to the outside option relative to all
consumers that substitute away from j.19
Table 7: A sample from 2005 of Own-Price and Cross-price Elasticities for
selected products.
VW Gol 1L
Fiat Uno Mille
Fiat Palio 1.3L
VW Gol 1.6L
GM Vectra 2.4L
Fiat Marea 2.4L

VW Gol 1L
-4.277
0.456
0.105
0.094
0.003
< 10−4

Fiat Uno Mille
0.596
-4.254
0.113
0.110
0.002
< 10−4

Fiat Palio 1.3L
0.349
0.289
-4.690
0.088
0.005
0.0001

VW Gol 1.6L GM Vectra 2.4L
0.310
0.045
0.278
0.023
0.087
0.024
-4.717
0.025
0.005
-6.315
0.0002
0.001

Note: The products displayed are the two best-sellers in each tax bin. Each entry in the table displays
index a column.

19

For the random coefficient logit model it is 100 ×
s0 /(1 − sj ).
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∂sj pi
∂pi sj

Fiat Marea 2.4L
0.050
0.027
0.028
0.040
0.044
-5.260

, where i index a row and j

ds0 /dpj
|dsj /dpj | .

For the logit model it is

Table 8 displays the diversion ratios for the logit model and for the
random coefficient logit model (RCL). In the standard logit model, a price
increase leads consumers to substitute to goods in proportion to their relative market share (IIA property). In a setting in which the outside option
has a large share, most consumers will substitute to it. This is problematic
because it generates counter-intuitive predictions. In particular, independently of price, the logit model predicts that most consumers substitute
from the inside goods to the outside good.
One important economic implication of my empirical demand model is
that it breaks the IIA property with respect to the outside option. The
RCL model implies heterogeneous substitution patterns towards the outside
option. As expected, it also captures the intuitive notion that there is some
vertical differentiation in the market and thus more expensive cars should
have a smaller diversion to the outside option.
Table 8: Substitution to the outside option
Logit
95.09
95
94.67
94.66
94.55
94.54

VW Gol 1L
Fiat Uno Mille
Fiat Palio 1.3L
VW Gol 1.6L
GM Vectra 2.4L
Fiat Marea 2.4L

RCL
34.79
34.60
30.77
29.55
3.01
7.09

Note: Given a price increase, the percentage who
substitutes to the outside option as a percentage of
all that substitute away from the product.

Table 9 displays the estimated markup over marginal cost for the sample
of selected products. The magnitudes of the estimates are plausible. I find
that cars in the first tax bin have low markups and cars in the third tax
bin have large markups. When I take into account the whole sample, I
find that markups in percent (Lerner Index) range from 19% to 41% with
a median of 25.8%. These estimates are on par with the ones obtained in
Berry et al. (1995); Petrin (2002) for the American automobile industry
during the 1980s and early 1990s but higher than the ones obtained by
Cosar et al. (2018) for the Brazilian automobile industry in the late 2000s.
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A possible explanation for the discrepancy between my estimates and
Cosar et al. (2018) estimates is that they use the whole income distribution
to draw consumers while I truncate the income distribution and use draws
from above the median (middle class and above). By doing so, my demand
estimates are less elastic and thus the markups are higher. Moreover, as
they pointed out, Brazil is the most concentrated market in their sample
and the most closed to foreign competition and hence the lowest income
can be compensated by the lack of competition. In addition, from 2005 to
2010, the nominal (real) interest rate in Brazil oscillated between 8.75%
and 18% (5% and 13%) per year. In such an economic environment, one
might argue that firms would not be willing to take the risk of producing
and selling cars for an average margin of 8%.
Table 9: A sample from 2005 of estimated price-marginal cost markup for
selected products.

VW Gol 1L
Fiat Uno Mille
Fiat Palio 1.3L
VW Gol 1.6L
GM Vectra 2.4L
Fiat Marea 2.4L
Market

Price
29,412
26,570
36,981
39,638
105,950
101,380
42,025

Markup($)
5,695
5,549
6,832
7,223
13,201
13,255
7,214

Note: The products displayed are the two best-sellers in each
tax bin. Market displays the sales weighted average price and
markup. Markup is defined as ps − mc.

6

Counterfactual

Using the Brazilian market in 2005 as a laboratory, I perform a series of
counterfactual exercises. The first counterfactual disentangles the effect
of the engine tax and market power on prices, pass-through and sales.
Then, it investigates the environmental and distributive impact of market
power. The second counterfactual examines how firms would reposition
their products to avoid the tax and quantify the impact of this repositioning
on equilibrium outcomes.
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6.1

The distributive and environmental effect of market power

I hold the set of products offered fixed and use the demand and marginal
cost estimates implied by the model to obtain equilibrium outcomes when:
(1) firms use marginal cost pricing and the engine tax is set to zero; (2) firms
use marginal cost pricing and the engine tax is in place; and (3) firms use
marginal cost pricing, the engine tax is in place but the tax pass-through
is the one implied by the Bertrand-Nash model.
The comparison between the outcomes in (1) and (2) provides a measure
of the distortions caused by the engine tax. The comparison between the
outcomes in (2) with the data, which is rationalized by the model previously
described, provides a measure of the total distortions caused by market
power. The comparison between outcomes in (2) and (3) highlights the role
of heterogeneous and incomplete pass-through in affecting CO2 emissions.
Lastly, the comparison between (3) and the data highlights the role of price
levels in affecting CO2 emissions.
Table 10 presents the counterfactual equilibrium outcomes (columns 1, 2
and 3) and the outcomes in the data (column 4). Consider the case of prices
and tax pass-through. Notice that market power is the most relevant factor
increasing prices. With marginal cost pricing the engine tax raises average
prices by approximately $1,600. In contrast, market power raises average
prices by approximately $9,200. The markup over marginal costs indicates
that market power affects not only price levels but also tax pass-through.
Intuitively, firms’ price at the elastic part of the demand curve, thus the
engine tax should be followed by a reduction in markups.20 On average, the
engine tax is not fully passed-on to consumers and is heterogeneous across
tax bins. In contrast, constant marginal cost together with marginal cost
pricing imply a tax pass-through of 100%.
The changes in prices caused by the tax schedule and market power
have a substantial impact on sales. With marginal cost pricing, the engine
20

To obtain tax pass-through under multi-product Bertrand-Nash, I use the first order
conditions characterizing the equilibrium in the pricing game to obtain equilibrium prices
in a setting without the engine tax. The difference between these prices and the prices
in the data divided by the difference in the amount of taxes is my measure of tax
pass-through.
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tax reduces total sales in 123,000 cars. Interestingly, the sales of cars in the
second tax bin fall by almost 168,000 cars. However, the discontinuities of
the tax schedule provide a substantial relative tax advantage for the cars
in the first tax bin. Hence, part of the sales reduction in the second tax
bin is compensated by consumers substituting towards cars in the first tax
bin. Furthermore, I find that market power has a heterogeneous impact
on sales across tax bins. On average, market power reduces sales in 21.5%,
29.4% and 38% in the first, second and third tax bins. Note also that
market power is a main factor reducing the total sales of cars. While the
engine tax reduces total sales in 123,000 cars, market power reduces sales
in 438,000 cars.
Table 10: Equilibrium outcomes with and without engine tax.
(1)

(2)
Mg.Cost Pricing

Sales
≤ 1L
(1L, 2L]
> 2L

No Engine Tax
1,905,015
916,304
982,019
6,690

Price
≤ 1L
(1L, 2L]
> 2L

31,178
21,768
39,674
73,025

Pass-through (%)
≤ 1L
(1L, 2L]
> 2L
CO2 (1000 kg)

102,975,540

(3)

Engine Tax Engine Tax (*)
1,781,780
1,822,031
964,042
1,017,813
813,986
800,298
3,752
3,918

(4)
Bertrand-Nash Pricing
Engine Tax
1,343,826
766,828
574,669
2,329

32,813
23,276
43,860
86,334

31,878
22,396
43,677
85,161

42,025
31,463
55,860
105,839

100
100
100
100

90.3
85.3
97
96

90.3
85.3
97
96

95,423,061

97,267,226

71,437,813

Note: Counterfactual outcomes are computed holding the set of products fixed. Price and Pass-through are sales weighted averages.

Next, I investigate how the change in price levels, tax pass-through and
total sales implied by market power affects the ability of the engine tax to
reduce CO2 emissions and its progressivity.
Market power and environmental impact of the engine tax
To compute the CO2 emissions of the cohort of cars sold in 2005 and
emissions in the different counterfactual scenarios, I use the parameters
considered by the Brazilian Environmental Agency when computing automobile pollution (MMA, 2014). These parameters include automobile
survival probabilities for 50 years, the average intensity of car usage per
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year for 50 years, and engineering measures of the amount of CO2 (kg) per
liter of fuel.
Using the fuel efficiency of each car (model/engine) offered by firms
(Km/L) and the average intensity of car usage per year (Km/year), I obtain
the average annual fuel consumption for each car (L/year). I do so for the
50 year period considered by the Brazilian Environmental Agency.21 Using
engineering measures of CO2 per liter of fuel, I obtain the amount of CO2
emitted by each car in a given year (Kg). For each year I adjust each car
emissions by its survival probability and scale up by the car (model/engine)
sales in 2005. Adding over every car offered in 2005 provides us the expected
total amount of CO2 emitted by the cohort of cars sold 2005.
Table 10 also displays the expected total emissions of CO2 by the cohort
of cars sold in 2005 under different competitive conduct assumptions and
with or without the engine tax. The counterfactual exercise suggests that
market power is the most relevant factor in reducing the emissions of CO2 .
The engine tax reduces the total expected emissions of CO2 in 7 million
tons. In contrast, market power reduces CO2 emissions in 24 million tons.
Decomposing the role of heterogeneous pass-through (column 2 vs 3)
and the increase in price levels caused by market power (columns 3 vs
4), we find that the increase in price levels is the main factor reducing
CO2 emissions. The incomplete pass-through attenuates the price signal
generated by the engine tax. Since prices do not increase as much as in the
case with complete pass-through, total sales do not fall as much either. At
the same time, market power raises price levels substantially. This increase
leads to a sizeable reduction in sales and thus in the total expected emissions
of CO2 .
Buchanan (1969) argues that a first-best policy designed to internalize
external damages should be implemented only in a perfect competitive
setting. The intuition behind the argument is that in settings in which
firms exert market power, the markups over marginal cost already impose
a quantity distortion. As such, a corrective tax is likely to impose further
distortions. To investigate the size of the potential welfare distortion caused
by the market power in our setting, I compute the “implicit tax” imposed
by the markup over marginal cost. Specifically, for each vehicle I divide the
21

The Brazilian Environmental Agency adjusts car usage according to its age.
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markup over marginal cost by its total expected emissions (tons of CO2 ).
Table 11 displays the results of the “implicit tax” generated by market
power. The results in column 1 were obtained under the assumption of
Betrand-Nash competition without the engine tax. The results in column
2 were obtained from the assumption of Bertrand-Nash competition with
the engine tax (data). The average exchange rate in 2010 was 1.76 Reais to
US$. As such, the average implicit tax generated by market power ranges
from US$ 70 to US$ 115, depending on the engine size and if the engine
tax is in place or not. Since the implicit tax exceeds the estimated damage
value of US$ 50 per ton of CO2 for all scenarios, we have that the engine
tax is likely to impose further distortions and reduce welfare.22
Table 11: Markups and implicit CO2 tax.
(1)
(2)
Bertrand-Nash Pricing
Markups ($)
≤ 1L
(1L, 2L]
> 2L

No Engine Tax
7,677
6,331
9,001
13,879

Engine Tax
7,214
6,026
8,776
13,201

143.2
129.1
157.1
202

135.9
122.9
153.1
192.1

Implicit tax ($/ton CO2 )
≤ 1L
(1L, 2L]
> 2L

Note: Counterfactual outcomes without the engine tax are obtained holding the set of
products fixed and solving the system of first order equations implied by the BertrandNash pricing game. Markups and the implicit tax are sales weighted averages. The
implicit tax is computed dividing markups ($) by the expected total emission (tons of
CO2 ) of each vehicle.

Market power and progressivity of the engine tax
For both marginal cost pricing and Bertrand-Nash pricing, I construct a
Gini coefficient that measures the cumulative share of the expected tax paid
by consumers given their income level (Suits, 1977). The Gini coefficient
is defined as the area between the 45◦ line and the Lorenz curve. It ranges
from −1 to 1, with negative values indicating a regressive tax, positive
22

I obtain the measure of social cost of carbon from Wagner et al. (2021).
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values indicating a progressive tax and 0 indicating a proportional tax.
The Lorenz curve is given by,

t(yk ) =

J
X
j=1

skj tj ,

P
k≤i f (yk )t(yk )
,
Li = P
k≤N f (yk )t(yk )

Fi =

X

f (yk )

(13)

k≤i

where, k index consumer and j index product. Furthermore, tj = pdj −
psj is the amount of tax paid when purchasing product j, skj (yk ) is the
probability that consumer with income yk purchases product j, and f (.) is
the pmf of the discretized income distribution.
Figure 3 displays two Lorenz curves for the engine tax, one for each
competitive conduct. The dashed line is used for perfect competition and
the solid line for Bertrand-Nash pricing. Market power generates a more
convex Lorenz curve. It then follows that market power increases the share
of the tax paid by high income consumers and thus it increases the progressivity of the engine tax. This result is confirmed when I calculate the Gini
coefficient for both cases: (i) the Gini coefficient is 0.71 with marginal cost
pricing; and (ii) the Gini coefficient is 0.76 with Bertrand-Nash pricing.
Figure 3: Tax Lorenz curve

As equation 13 indicates, market power affects the Gini coefficient
through two channels. First, market power affects the amount of tax levied
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on each product, tj . Second, market power affects choice probabilities. In
particular, it affects tj because of changes in the price levels and tax passthrough. In turn, these changes in prices affect the individual probability
choices. To capture each of these effects, I compute two alternative Gini
coefficients:
• G′ is constructed based on price levels and quantities from marginal
cost pricing model but uses the tax pass-through implied by the
Bertrand-Nash model to adjust tj .
• G′′ is constructed using the same tj as in G′ but uses the quantities
implied by Bertrand-Nash pricing.
The comparison of the Gini coefficient obtained under marginal cost
pricing (0.71) with G′ (0.72) captures the effect of the heterogeneous tax
pass-through implied by Bertrand-Nash Pricing. The increase in Gini coefficient indicates that the heterogeneous pass-through increases the progressivity of the engine tax. This result is consistent with the fact that
under Bertrand-Nash pricing, the average pass-through in the first tax bin
is smaller than average pass-through in the second and third tax bins.
The comparison of G′ (0.72) with G′′ (0.77) captures how the impact
of market power on sales affects the progressivity of the engine tax. The
increase in the Gini coefficient indicates that the reduction in sales increases
the progressivity of the engine tax. This result is consistent with the higher
prices implied by market power leading to a reduction in overall market
participation of consumers with lower incomes. Lastly, the comparison
of G′′ (0.77) with the Gini coefficient obtained under Bertrand-Nash (0.76)
captures the effect of price levels on the progressivity of the engine tax. This
result indicates that the overall price levels under Bertrand-Nash pricing
are regressive and is consistent with the relative higher markups faced by
automobiles in the first tax bin.

6.2

The impact of the engine tax on product assortment

The second counterfactual investigates the impact of the engine tax on
equilibrium product assortment. To this end, I compare the outcomes in
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the data, which are assumed to be an equilibrium of a game in which
firms choose product assortment and prices under the engine tax, with the
equilibrium outcomes of a game in which firms choose product assortment
and prices when the engine tax is not in place.
To incorporate the assortment stage of the game in the counterfactual
analysis, I need to deal with the fixed costs for each product that the firms
can offer. The common procedure in the literature would be to assume
that total fixed cost is the sum of the fixed cost of each product. Together
with the pricing model, this assumption can be used to estimate fixed cost
bounds using a revealed preference argument.23
With the upper and lower bounds on the fixed cost of each product one
can follow Berry et al. (2016); Fan and Yang (2020) and use the bounds
estimates to simulate fixed costs draws. These draws would then be used
to compute the counterfactual outcomes. Another alternative is to use the
bounds to estimate average fixed costs bounds and then use the estimates to
run the counterfactual exercise. However, doing so would require further
assumptions about what firms know when playing the game and on the
distribution of fixed costs in order to circumvent the selection problem
(Eizenberg, 2014; Pakes et al., 2015).
Instead of using the bound estimates directly or relying on additional
econometric assumptions to overcome the selection problem, I draw on
the assumption that fixed costs of production are the same for different
engines of the same model but are potentially different across models. Since
the analysis considers only models made in Brazil and the versions of the
same model with different engines are usually built in the same plant, the
assumption of homogeneous fixed cost for different engines of the same
model seems like a reasonable simplification of the problem.
Motivated by the fact that in our sample the number of models produced in Brazil and the number of engines per model are stable over time, I
restrict the counterfactual analysis to the case in which the models offered
23

For products that we know firms could have offered but decided not to offer it must
have been that the fixed cost of adding that product exceeded the profit generated by
it. Thus, the change in variable profit following the addition of a product k provides
a lower bound for the fixed cost of producing k. For products that were offered, we
know that the profit accrued by offering it must have exceeded its fixed cost. Hence, the
change in variable profit obtained with the removal of a product k ′ provides an upper
bound on its fixed cost.
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and the number of engines per model are fixed. This counterfactual exercise
does not account for the possibility of dropping models, for the possibility
of introducing new models or for the possibility of changing the number of
engines offered per model. As such, it should be interpreted as a measurement of what firms would do in the short/mid-run when their production
facilities are fixed, and they can only respond to changes in the economic
environment by choosing products that are immediately available.
To fix ideas, consider an example of the possible actions in the counterfactual. In 2005, Renault offered the Clio (model) in Brazil with two
different engine displacements: Clio 1L and Clio 1.6L. At the same time, it
could have offered the Clio 1.1L and the Clio 1.4L. Thus, when considering
what products to offer, Renault chooses between any product combination
that contains two versions of the Renault Clio. Specifically, it chooses one
alternative of the set {(Clio 1L, Clio 1.1L); (Clio 1L, Clio 1.6L); (Clio
1L, Clio 1.4L); (Clio 1.1L, Clio 1.4L); (Clio 1.4L, Clio 1.6L); (Clio 1.1L,
Clio 1.6L)}.
The restriction on fixed cost heterogeneity together with the restriction
on the set of feasible alternatives implies that firms are choosing between
sets of products that have the same total fixed cost. In the absence of setup costs, the counterfactual can be computed comparing only the variable
profit generated by each combination without considering estimates of fixed
costs. Intuitively, the change in the tax schedule changes firms’ variable
profits relative to the engine tax but not their fixed cost. Thus, firms have
incentives to change their product assortment.
Obtaining the equilibrium counterfactual set of products without the
engine tax is challenging because it requires computing expected profits
for a substantial number of alternatives. To overcome this computational
problem, I employ the algorithm developed in Fan and Yang (2020). The
algorithm begins with firms offering the products observed in the data.
Firms move sequentially based on their market share. When called to play,
a firm consider all one car replacements that do not change the number of
models offered or the number of engines offered for each model.24 If the
24

At every deviation, equilibrium prices for all products are obtained by solving the
first order conditions of the pricing game. Moreover, I use the empirical distribution of
marginal cost and demand shocks to compute the expected profit of any given set of
products.
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firm playing does not find profitable to deviate, then the observed set of
products is that firms’ best response and the algorithm moves to the next
firm. Otherwise, I consider all analogous one product replacements from
the set of products that generated the highest payoff, continuing until the
firm playing does not find it profitable to deviate. The algorithm continues
until no firm can benefit from any one product replacement given what the
rivals are offering.
Figure 4a displays what would have been the number of cars offered in
2005, by engine displacement, if the engine tax was not in place. Figure
4b displays the number of cars, by engine displacement, that were actually
offered. As the figures indicate, the engine tax leads firms to reposition
their cars. There is an increase in the number of cars with 1.6L, 1.7L and
1.8L engines. This increase is due to the upgrading of cars with engine
displacement between 1.1L and 1.4L.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual and factual offering by engine displacement in
2005
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(a) Counterfactual (no engine tax)
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(b) Factual (engine tax)

Table 12 displays market outcomes under three different scenarios. The
first column displays the equilibrium outcomes when the engine tax set to
zero and firms are only able to choose prices. The second column displays
the equilibrium outcomes obtained when the engine tax is set to zero and
firms choose product assortment and prices. The third column displays
outcomes associated with the engine tax and the products offered in the
data, i.e, the factual data. To quantify the impact of the engine tax on
equilibrium outcomes, I treat the the setting without the engine tax as the
benchmark and compare the outcomes in the third column of table 12 with
the outcomes in the first and second column.
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The engine tax decreases the average fuel efficiency of the cars offered
from 9.33 Km/L to 9.10 Km/L. Specifically, the discontinuities in the tax
schedule give firms incentives to move away from the tax thresholds. Firms
do so by replacing products with engine displacement between 1.1L and
1.4L for products with engine displacement between 1.6L and 1.8L. Not
accounting for the change in product assortment overstates the impact of
the engine tax on the fuel efficiency of the products demanded. Holding the
set of products fixed, the engine tax increases the sales weighted average
fuel-efficiency in from 9.78 Km/L to 9.88 Km/L. When the product assortment is allowed to change, the engine tax decreases the sales weighted
average fuel-efficiency from 9.99 Km/L to 9.88 Km/L.
Product assortment responses also impact the total sales of automobiles.
In particular, not accounting for the impact of the engine tax on product
assortment understates its impact on the total number of cars sold. Holding
the set of products fixed, the engine tax decreases total sales by 113,000
cars. In contrast, when firms adjust product assortment, the engine tax
reduces total sales by 158,000 cars.
I use the procedure in the previous subsection to quantify how the
impact of the engine tax on fuel efficiency and total sales translates into
the emissions of CO2 . To this end, I compute total expected emissions of
CO2 when firms adjust only prices and when firms adjust both prices and
product assortment. The results indicate that the reduction in product
variety caused by the engine tax and the further reduction in total sales
that follows is the major factor reducing total expected CO2 emissions by
the cohort of cars sold in 2005.
Table 13 displays the impact of the engine tax schedule on measures of
surplus. The first column considers the case in which firms respond to the
tax by only changing their prices. The second column considers the case in
which firms respond to the tax by changing prices and product assortment.
Independently of how firms respond to the engine tax, consumers bear
most of the burden of the tax. However, not considering the effect of
the tax on product assortment understates the loss in consumer surplus
by approximately $3.3 billion Reais. The additional surplus loss comes
mainly from the reduction in the variety of engines faced by consumers.
Furthermore, ignoring that firms can also respond by changing the products
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Table 12: Counterfactual market outcomes for 2005
No Engine Tax
Price
Price & Product
Price
40,928
41,253
Markup ($)
8,373
8,261
Lerner Index(%)
26.12
25.53
Avg. Km/L
9.10
9.33
Sales weighted Avg. Km/L
9.78
9.99
Sales
1,498,857
1,544,405
CO2 (1000 kg)
80,639,040
81,191,866

Engine Tax
43,025
7,887
25.60
9.10
9.88
1,385,706
73,777,569

Note: Price, Markup and Lerner Index are sales-weighted averages. Column “Price” displays outcome
measures when firms respond to the change in the tax rates by changing only markups. Column “Price &
Product” displays outcome measures when firms respond to the change in tax rate by changing markups
and also repositioning the products offered. To make results comparable, all of the outcomes are averages
across equilibrium outcomes obtained under different ξ and ω shocks.

understates the profits losses caused by the tax schedule.
Tax revenues are also affected by firms’ response. When firms are assumed to respond to the tax by only re-optimizing prices, the tax generates
a revenue of almost $3.9 billion Reais. When we consider that firms respond
to the discontinuities in the tax schedule by changing prices and product
assortment, the tax generates revenues of $3.4 billion Reais. Miravete et al.
(2018) show empirically that strategic price responses reduce the government ability to raise tax revenues in the market for spirits in Pennsylvania.
Taken together, my results indicate another dimension in which firms’ response can mitigate the government effort to raise tax revenues - changes
in product assortment. This dimension is particularly relevant in settings
with differentiated goods. Lastly, not accounting for the impact of taxes on
the products offered understates the deadweight loss caused by the taxation
in approximately $4 billion Reais.
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Table 13: Changes in surplus and tax revenue when tax schedule goes from
no engine tax to engine tax.
Price response
-5,190

Product & Price response
-8,412

∆ Profit ($ mil.)

-1,621

-1,829

∆ Tax Revenue ($ mil.)

3,877

3,403

∆ Total Surplus ($ mil.)

-2,934

-6,838

∆ Consumer Surplus ($ mil.)

Note: Column “Price Response” displays the surplus measures when firms respond to the change in the engine tax
by changing only markups. Column “Price & Product” displays the surplus measures when firms respond to the
change in engine tax by changing markups and also repositioning the products offered.
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Conclusion

I use the Brazilian automobile industry to study the impact of a discontinuous (notched) tax schedule on markups, prices and firms’ decisions to
reposition their products in different areas of the product space. To this
end, I estimate a model of demand and supply for automobiles in Brazil.
Demand builds on the random coefficient logit model proposed by Berry
et al. (1995). Supply builds on a two-stage game. In the first stage firms
simultaneously choose the set of products they offer. In the second stage,
conditional on the set of products chosen in the first stage, firms simultaneously choose prices.
The first finding is that strategic pricing responses imply heterogeneous
and incomplete tax pass-through across products: average pass-through is
85% for products in the first tax bin, 97% for products in the second tax
bin and 96% for products in the third tax bin. The heterogeneous and incomplete pass-through together with the increase in price levels caused by
market power impact the ability of the tax schedule in addressing its environmental and distributive goals. With the quantity distortion implied by
the markup over marginal costs, it is likely that market power distorts equilibrium quantities past the first best. Also, the main mechanism through
which market power increases the progressivity of the tax schedule is by
driving consumers with low/middle income out of the market.
The second finding is that the discontinuities of the engine tax lead
firms to choose engine sizes away from the thresholds defined by the tax
schedule. This movement reduces the variety of engines offered and in turn
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it provides a further reduction in total sales. Not accounting for the variety
effect of the engine tax would understate its ability to reduce the emissions
of CO2 .
The notched structure of the engine tax has the advantage of highlighting what the policy objectives are. Regardless of the policy objectives, my
analysis points out the importance of accounting for market power and the
strategic pricing and product assortment responses when studying taxation
in differentiated goods markets. Together with recent empirical work by
Fowlie et al. (2016) and Preonas (2019), my results provide empirical support for Buchanan (1969) insights that market power and the associated
allocative inefficiencies limit the ability of corrective taxes to achieve the
first best allocation. However, I depart from these papers by empirically
pointing out a novel and important dimension in which firms’ response can
impact the ability of the government to achieve its desired policy goals changes in product assortment. These responses are particularly relevant
in differentiated goods markets like automobiles and household appliances.
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A

Allowing Fixed Cost Heterogeneity

In this appendix I investigate how the restriction on fixed cost heterogeneity
impacts the counterfactual exercise in which firms are allowed to change
product assortment. My starting point is the observation that the empirical
model allows me to obtain an upper bound on the fixed cost of products
that were offered and a lower bound on the fixed cost of products that firms
could have offered.
The assumption that the outcomes observed in the data are a Nash
Equilibrium implies that given competitors’ product portfolio, no firm is
able to increase its expected profits by unilaterally changing the assortment of products it offers. It then follows that two types of counterfactual
deviations are helpful to obtain bounds on fixed costs: removing a product
that is observed in the data and adding a product that firms could have
offered but did not.
First, consider the empirical content of removing a product j that we
observe firms offering in the data. Nash Equilibrium and a revealed preference argument indicate that for products that were offered, the expected
profit gains obtained by offering it must have exceeded the fixed cost of
offering the product. Hence, the change in expected variable profits that
follows the removal of a product j provides an upper bound on its fixed
cost:

h

E(ω′t ,ξ′t ) πf∗

Jf t , J−f t , ω ′t , ξ ′t



−

πf∗

Jf t \{j}, J−f t , ω ′t , ξ ′t

i

≥ F Cj ∀j ∈ Jf t
(14)

′
where πf∗ Jf t , J−f t , ω ′t , ξ t is the 2nd stage profit obtained by f when its

product assortment is Jf t , πf∗ Jf t \{j}, J−f t , ω ′t , ξ ′t is the 2nd stage profit
obtained by f when j is not offered, F Cj is the fixed cost of offering product
j and E(ω′t ,ξ′t ) [.] is the expectation operator with respect to demand and
marginal cost shocks.
Now, consider the empirical content of adding a product k that firms
could have offered but decided not to. Nash Equilibrium and a revealed
preference argument indicate that the fixed cost of adding product k exceeded the gain in expected profit generated by it. Thus, the change in
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expected variable profits following the addition of a product k provides a
lower bound for the fixed cost of offering k:

h
i

′
′
∗
′
∗
′
F Ck ≥ E
πf Jf t ∪ {k}, J−f t , ω t , ξ t − πf Jf t , J−f t , ω t , ξ t ∀k ∈ Jf t
(15)
I use the demand and marginal cost estimates to obtain the fixed cost
upper and lower bounds implied by inequalities 14 and 15. To compute expected profits, I simulate draws from the empirical distribution of (ω ′t , ξ ′t ).
For each simulated draw, I compute equilibrium prices and the implied
variable profits. Then, I average variable profits across all draws.
Figure 5a displays the distribution of the fixed cost lower bounds. The
average lower bound is 62 million Reais. Figure 5b displays the distribution
of the fixed cost upper bounds. The average upper bound is 106 million
Reais and the two vehicles with upper bounds greater than 600 million
Reais are the two best sellers in the sample.25 To have an idea of how the
fixed cost bounds compare to the variable profits, let’s focus on the specific
case of Chevrolet. Using the markups implied by the model, I obtain that
the average variable profit per vehicle produced by Chevrolet in Brazil is
$7,312. Using the fixed cost bounds, I obtain that the average fixed cost
per vehicle produced by Chevrolet in Brazil ranges from $3,505 to $5,404.26
These estimates indicate that fixed costs of production take a considerable
share of profits, but firms are still able to obtain a sizeable return.
The empirical model and revealed preferences only allow me to obtain
an upper bound on the fixed cost of products that were offered and a lower
bound on the fixed cost of products that firms could have offered. But, to
use the two-stage game to run the counterfactual analysis, I need to obtain
the fixed cost for each product that firms can offer. Following Fan and Yang
(2020), I fill the missing bound for each product and then I uniformly draw
10 fixed cost shocks within the implied fixed cost range for each product.
(ω ′t ,ξ′t )

25

External validation for the fixed cost bounds is difficult as firms keep this type of
information confidential.
26
For each firm, I sum over the implied fixed cost upper/lower bounds and divide the
resulting number by total sales. Notice that by computing the average over products
that were offered (upper bound) and products that were not offered (lower bound) I am
not accounting for potential selection issues.
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Figure 5: Distribution of fixed cost lower/upper bounds

(a) Fixed cost lower bound

(b) Fixed cost upper bound

Table 14 summarizes the different approaches used to fill the missing
fixed cost bound. The first approach draws from Eizenberg (2014) and uses
within firm information to fill the missing bounds. This approach relies on
two assumptions: (1) for each firm, the support of the distribution of fixed
costs is bounded; and (2) these bounds are contained within the support of
the changes in expected variable profits. The second approach is analogous
to the first approach but uses information within the entire sample to fill the
missing bounds. Lastly, the third approach imposes an ad-hoc restriction
on the range of fixed costs.
Table 14: Different approaches used to fill missing fixed cost bounds
(1)

(2)

(3)

Missing lower bound
(j is offered)

mink∈Jf {Fk }

mink∈J {Fk }

0.5 × F̄j

Missing upper bound
(j is a potential prod.)

maxk∈Jf {F̄k }

maxk∈J {F̄k }

5 × Fj

Note: Jf is the set of products available to firm f . J is the set of products available in the
market for all firms.
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Table 15 displays the outcomes displayed in section 6.2 (columns 1 and
2) and the average equilibrium outcomes over 10 fixed cost draws obtained
under different assumptions on the range of fixed cost for each car (columns
3 to 6). The second counterfactual (column 2) was obtained under the
assumption that fixed costs are homogeneous for different versions of the
same model but are potentially different across models. Relative to the
counterfactual in which firms are only able to adjust prices (column 1) we
have that product assortment responses to the engine tax reduce the variety
of engines offered and this reduction decreases total sales. By allowing
for fixed cost heterogeneity across different versions of the same model
(columns 3 - 6) we also find that the product assortment responses to the
engine tax reduce the variety of engines offered and this reduction decreases
total sales. However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller in particular
for the ad-hoc specification on the range of fixed cost bounds.
Table 15: Equilibrium outcomes - product assortment counterfactual
No Engine Tax
Fixed Product
Space
Price
40,928
Markup ($)
8,373
Lerner Index(%)
26.12
Avg. Km/L
9.10
Sales weighted Avg. Km/L
9.78
Sales
1,498,857
CO2 (tons)
80,639,040

Restricted FC
Heterogeneity
41,253
8,261
25.53
9.33
9.99
1,544,405
81,191,867

Engine Tax

Approach 1 Approach 2

Approach 3

40,998
8,028
25.01
9.13
9.86
1,524,846
81,371,062

40,722
8,159
25.54
9.12
9.81
1,502,962
80,656,612

40,684
8,171
25.58
9.11
9.81
1,501,703
80,708,928

43,025
7,887
25.60
9.10
9.88
1,385,706
73,777,569

Note: Price, Markup and Lerner Index are sales-weighted averages. Column “Price” displays outcome measures when firms respond to the change in the tax rates by
changing only markups. Column “Price & Product” displays outcome measures when firms respond to the change in tax rate by changing markups and also repositioning
the products offered.
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